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ABSTRACT 
According to Auditing Standard No. 14, fraud is an intentional act. Thus, when a 
misstatement is identified during the audit, auditors should consider whether the 
misstatement might have been caused intentionally (PCAOB 2010a). The objective of the 
present study is to investigate whether considering the perspective of the manager 
responsible for a misstatement’s occurrence impacts auditors’ beliefs concerning the 
misstatement’s intentionality. Using an experiment with 82 audit manager and senior 
manager participants, I find that auditors who actively consider the perspective of the 
manager who caused a misstatement assess the likelihood that the misstatement is 
intentional higher when the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of high versus 
low fraud risk. Conversely, auditors who do not consider the manager’s perspective do 
not assess misstatement intentionality any differently in the presence of high fraud risk 
versus low fraud risk information. These findings suggest that the ability to recognize 
when client circumstances suggest an increased risk that a misstatement was caused 
intentionally may depend on whether auditors consider the perspective of the manager 
responsible for the misstatement.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When a misstatement is identified during the audit, auditors are responsible for 
evaluating whether it is indicative of fraud (Auditing Standard No. 14 – PCAOB 2010a). 
The primary characteristic that differentiates a fraudulent misstatement from an error is 
whether the underlying action that resulted in the misstatement was intentional or 
unintentional (AICPA 2002). If a misstatement’s intentionality hinges on the intent of the 
individual(s) who caused it, then it is important that auditors are sensitive to fraud risk 
factors specifically related to those responsible individuals. Although evaluating a 
manager’s intent might be difficult (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2007), a good starting point is 
to consider the incentives and opportunities of the manager responsible for a 
misstatement’s occurrence.1 The objective of the present study is to investigate how the 
use of perspective taking impacts auditors’ assessments of a misstatement’s 
intentionality.
2
 According to psychology theory, evaluating a misstatement from the 
perspective of the manager who caused it should increase auditors’
                                                 
1
 When evaluating the potential for fraud, the auditing standards recommend that auditors consider whether 
client conditions provide management with an incentive, opportunity, or the ability to rationalize a 
fraudulent act, which is referred to as the fraud triangle (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010b). Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) argue that a fourth element, capability, should be added to make a “fraud diamond.” 
When a manager has knowledge of a business process and/or access to influence transactions, the ability to 
perpetrate fraud is increased (Wolfe and Hermanson 2004). Thus, the ability of a manager to cause a 
misstatement should be considered a fraud red flag.  
 
2
 Perspective taking is a type of mental simulation in which an individual imagines himself in another 
individual’s shoes and considers his own thoughts and actions under the circumstances facing another 
individual (Batson 2009; Davis et al. 1996; Coutu 1951; Epley and Caruso 2009). 
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 attention to the circumstances surrounding the misstatement and how they might have 
influenced a manager’s intentions to misstate (e.g., Regan and Totten 1975; Ross and 
Nisbett 1991).  
Considering whether misstatements might be intentional is an important aspect of 
fraud detection, as evidenced by its explicit inclusion in AS No. 14 (PCAOB 2010a). 
Although fraud is often thought of as (and often may be) a multimillion dollar scheme 
involving the top members of management (Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 2010), 
intentional misstatements may also occur on a smaller scale. An intentional misstatement, 
even if it does not clearly exceed materiality, calls into question the integrity of 
management and should lead to a number of responses required by the auditing standards 
(PCAOB 2010a).
3
 In fact, even believing that a misstatement might be intentional should 
prompt auditors to discuss concerns with client management and/or the audit committee 
and investigate the misstatement further to determine if fraud has in fact occurred 
(PCAOB 2010a). Recent PCAOB reports, however, indicate that auditors do not 
investigate whether misstatements are indicative of fraud when perhaps they should 
(PCAOB 2007), which suggests that additional improvements (and additional research) 
are needed within this important area of fraud detection. In a recent Practice Alert, the 
PCAOB stressed the importance of applying professional skepticism throughout the 
course of the audit and discouraged auditors from dismissing identified misstatements as 
immaterial without first giving them adequate consideration (PCAOB 2012).  
                                                 
3
 According to AS No. 14, if auditors believe that a misstatement is or might be intentional, they should 
evaluate the implications on the integrity of management and the assessment of fraud risk as well as 
consider whether additional audit evidence might be necessary to determine if fraud has occurred (PCAOB 
2010a). Furthermore, SAB No. 99 states that an intentional misstatement, regardless of magnitude, may be 
considered an “illegal act” under federal securities law, and illegal acts must be reported to the audit 
committee (SEC 1999). Finally, believing that a misstatement might be intentional should influence 
auditors’ materiality judgments (SEC 1999). 
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Previous studies in the auditing literature related to improving fraud detection 
have primarily focused on the planning phase of the audit (e.g., Asare and Wright 2004; 
Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Carpenter 2007; Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; Simon 
2012). However, evaluating whether an identified misstatement might be intentional 
involves a somewhat different evaluation process than what is typically employed during 
fraud planning judgments. Evaluating the cause of an identified misstatement requires a 
backwards, explanatory evaluation process in which auditors attempt to determine a 
cause (fraud or error) of an observed event (misstatement). Furthermore, understanding 
how a misstatement came about often involves the consideration of a specific client 
action that occurred under a specific set of circumstances.  
There is evidence within the psychology literature that an evaluation involving (1) 
a backwards inference process and/or (2) the understanding of a specific action under a 
specific set of circumstances results in a tendency to ignore the role of existing 
circumstances in influencing behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971; Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1986; Gilbert 2002). A failure to consider how client circumstances might have 
influenced a manager’s actions is likely to make it difficult for auditors to determine if a 
misstatement was caused intentionally.  
In an effort to detect fraud, it is important to consider the existence of client 
circumstances that make the perpetration of fraud more desirable (i.e., an incentive) or 
easier to perpetrate and conceal (i.e., an opportunity) (PCAOB 2010a). According to 
psychology theory, evaluating another individual’s actions from that person’s point of 
view fosters an increased understanding of how existing circumstances might have 
influenced behavior (e.g., Regan and Totten 1975; Ross and Nisbett 1991; Eyal et al. 
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2008). By considering the perspective of the manager responsible for a misstatement, I 
expect that auditors will recognize the existence of fraud risk factors that may have 
provided the manager with an incentive and opportunity to intentionally misstate. Thus, 
when the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of high fraud risk, 
auditors who engage in perspective taking will be more likely to believe that the 
misstatement was caused intentionally and investigate further.   
Using an experiment, I examine whether considering the perspective of the 
manager responsible for a misstatement affects auditors’ assessments of a misstatement’s 
intentionality. My study manipulates the fraud risk factors surrounding an identified 
misstatement to be indicative of a higher or lower risk of fraud. I attempt to manipulate 
perspective taking by instructing some auditors to imagine themselves in the shoes of the 
manager responsible for the misstatement. I also use a measured variable to capture the 
extent to which auditors actively considered the perspective of the manager. Both the 
manipulation and the measured variable are common ways of testing perspective taking 
in the psychology literature (Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Mallett et 
al. 2008).  
I find that while the manipulated variable did not appear to induce perspective 
taking, the measured variable shows that auditors who actively considered the manager’s 
perspective were more sensitive to the fraud risk factors surrounding the misstatement 
compared to auditors who did not use perspective taking.
4
 When the fraud risk factors 
surrounding the misstatement were indicative of high risk, auditors who actively 
considered the manager’s perspective assessed the misstatement as significantly more 
                                                 
4
 The effects of perspective taking were obtained after controlling for participant effort and experience. 
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likely to be intentional compared to auditors who did not use perspective taking. 
Interestingly, the auditors who did not consider the manager’s perspective assessed the 
misstatement’s intentionality the same in both the high fraud risk and the low fraud risk 
condition. Thus, it would appear that the ability to recognize when client circumstances 
suggest an increased risk that a misstatement was caused intentionally may depend on 
whether auditors consider the perspective of the manager responsible for the 
misstatement.  
The present study contributes to the audit literature and to audit practice in a 
number of important ways. First, I provide evidence concerning the type of reasoning 
process that may help auditors assess the risk that an identified misstatement was caused 
intentionally. Perspective taking presumably provides auditors with insight into whether a 
manager was likely to have perceived misstating to be personally beneficial (an 
incentive) and reasonably easy to perpetrate and conceal (an opportunity). It is possible 
that while misstating the financial statements might not help management in general to 
meet a bonus target or analyst earnings target, it may nonetheless increase the 
compensation or performance evaluation of an individual manager. Thus, in addition to 
considering fraud risks at the company level, auditors also should consider fraud risks 
that are specific to an operating location or individual manager (AICPA 2002; Carcello 
and Hermanson 2008). My study provides insight into the type of reasoning process that 
may be helpful when seeking to understand the intentions of an individual manager.  
Second, my study responds to the PCAOB’s concerns that auditors are not 
displaying sufficient professional skepticism at the point in which a misstatement is 
identified (PCAOB 2007). Believing that a misstatement is immaterial does not excuse 
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auditors from applying a sufficient level of professional skepticism, including 
considering whether the misstatement might be intentional (PCAOB 2010a; PCAOB 
2012). The results of my study suggest that auditors are more skeptical of an identified 
misstatement (i.e., believe that it is more likely to be intentional) when surrounding 
circumstances are indicative of high versus low fraud risk, but only when they consider 
the manager’s perspective. Because one’s ability to successfully take the perspective of 
another is believed to be improved through direct experience (Iannotti 1978; Chalmers 
and Townsend 1990), audit firms may want to consider integrating perspective taking 
tasks into future firm trainings. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops my hypotheses. The methodology and results are described in 
Chapter 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and limitations 
of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 EVALUATING MISSTATEMENT INTENTIONALITY AND ATTENTION TO FRAUD RISKS 
Most of the fraud detection literature to date has focused on the planning phase of 
the audit (see Hammersley 2011 for an extensive review of the fraud planning literature). 
The auditing standards require the performance of various fraud planning procedures 
(e.g., fraud risk assessments, brainstorming sessions); thus, fraud should be a primary 
focus for auditors during the planning phase of the audit (Braun 2000). Hammersley 
(2011) concludes in her review of the fraud planning literature that auditors generally are 
sensitive to the presence of fraud risk factors when planning the audit. However, the 
planning phase of the audit is not the only point at which fraud should be considered. 
Auditors should be sensitive to fraud risks during all stages of the audit (AICPA 2002; 
PCAOB 2010a).  
One point at which auditors should specifically consider the potential for fraud is 
upon identifying a misstatement within the financial statements. When a misstatement is 
identified, auditors should consider whether the misstatement is indicative of fraud 
(PCAOB 2010a). No study of which I am aware provides direct evidence of auditors’ 
sensitivity to fraud risk factors when evaluating the cause of an identified misstatement. 
However, there is some evidence that auditors are not always sensitive to the presence of 
fraud during later stages of the audit. Prior studies suggest that auditors’ sensitivity to 
fraud during evidence evaluation may be lower when auditing an account assessed as 
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having a low risk of misstatement (Phillips 1999) or when the documentation of fraud 
risks during the planning phase lacks sufficient detail (Hammersley et al. 2010). Braun 
(2000) reports that during the performance of testing procedures, auditors generally are 
not sensitive to qualitative information indicative of fraud, particularly when they are 
placed under time pressure. Braun (2000) concludes that unlike the planning phase of the 
audit where fraud is a primary focus, during later stages of the audit, fraud becomes a 
secondary task.  
In recent years, the importance placed on fraud detection has increased 
substantially (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010a, 2010b). Thus, it is possible that auditors are 
sensitive to information indicative of fraud when evaluating identified misstatements. 
However, PCAOB inspection reports have documented multiple instances in which 
auditors have failed to investigate whether departures from GAAP were indicative of 
fraud, suggesting that auditors are not applying sufficient levels of professional 
skepticism when misstatements are identified (PCAOB 2007). Due to the high frequency 
of misstatements encountered by auditors during their careers that are due to error rather 
than fraud, auditors are likely to believe that most identified misstatements are 
unintentional (Libby 1985; Loebbecke et al. 1989). If auditors are too quick to conclude 
that an identified misstatement is unintentional, they may fail to recognize when the 
circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of high fraud risk.   
The psychology literature suggests that there are two characteristics associated 
with the process evaluating a misstatement that may naturally result in a general 
insensitivity to fraud risk factors. First, evaluating a misstatement for evidence of fraud 
involves a backwards inference process. A backwards inference is one in which an 
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outcome is known (e.g., a known misstatement is identified) and a cause must be inferred 
(e.g., error or fraud) (O’Donnell 2004; Koonce et al. 2011). During backwards inferences, 
attention is divided between the various causes that might explain an outcome, rather than 
focusing on the circumstances that make one particular cause more likely (Schustack and 
Sternberg 1981; Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; Waller and Felix 1989). When applied to the 
evaluation of an identified misstatement, this suggests that rather than focusing 
exclusively on the presence of fraud risk factors (i.e., the circumstances that make fraud a 
more likely cause), auditors’ attention will be divided between fraud and error as 
potential causes.
5
 While considering the potential for fraud and error simultaneously is 
not necessarily improper, it does suggest that auditors will be less sensitive to information 
indicative of fraud than they would be if they were considering fraud in isolation. 
Second, assessing whether a misstatement might be intentional often involves the 
evaluation of a specific client action performed under a specific set of circumstances. 
Many studies in psychology have reported that in an effort to make sense of (or attribute 
a cause to) another individual’s actions, there is a tendency to ignore the role of the 
situation in influencing behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971; Galper 1976; Gilbert 
2002). Instead, these studies find that people tend to attribute the actions of others to their 
stable dispositional traits.
6
 Thus, when auditors evaluate an identified misstatement, the 
                                                 
5
 Conversely, fraud planning procedures involve a forward inference process in which auditors reason 
about fraud in a forward, predictive manner. During forward inferences, a particular cause (e.g., fraud) is 
typically considered in isolation along with the circumstances that make that cause more likely to result in 
an outcome (e.g., misstatement) (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; Waller and Felix 1989). Thus, during fraud 
planning procedures, auditors’ attention is likely focused primarily on fraud and the existence of fraud risk 
factors (Braun 2000; Hammersley 2011). 
 
6
 A dispositional trait is a stable characteristic of one’s personality. However, people do not always act in 
ways that are consistent with their dispositions. As the time for action draws near, individuals are 
influenced less by their dispositions and more by whether the immediate circumstances enable or constrain 
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psychology literature suggests that they will not consider how existing circumstances 
might have influenced a manager to intentionally misstate the financial statements. For 
example, an auditor may attribute an identified misstatement to a manager’s 
incompetence (a disposition), thus concluding it to be unintentional, and fail to recognize 
that the manager’s compensation or performance evaluation criteria provided him with an 
incentive to intentionally misstate.  
2.2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING 
The psychology literature suggests that a greater understanding of how existing 
circumstances might have influenced another’s behavior is achieved by considering the 
individual’s point of view (i.e., perspective taking). Perspective taking is a type of mental 
simulation in which an individual imagines himself in another’s place and considers his 
own thoughts and actions under the circumstances facing another individual (Coutu 1951; 
Davis et al. 1996; Batson 2009; Epley and Caruso 2009). Perspective taking has been 
used in a variety of contexts in psychology as a method for improving interpersonal 
understanding and is theorized to provide insight into another individual’s thoughts and 
feelings (e.g., Piaget 1932; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000).
7
   
Prior studies in auditing have found that actually stepping into the shoes of the 
client via role playing can lead to improved negotiation outcomes and financial reporting 
quality (Trotman et al. 2005; Peytcheva et al. 2012). Role playing involves actively 
playing out the role of another individual (Coutu 1951). Trotman et al. (2005) find that 
                                                                                                                                                 
behavior (Eyal et al. 2009). Thus, even generally honest managers might commit fraud if the circumstances 
make it appear advantageous and feasible (AICPA 2002; Carpenter and Reimers 2005). 
 
7
 According to Hurtt (2010), interpersonal understanding is one of the primary components of professional 
skepticism and consists of understanding the motivations and perceptions of individual managers. 
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auditors who played the role of the client during a mock negotiation subsequently 
negotiated larger write-downs during the actual negotiation with the client compared to 
auditors receiving other negotiation interventions. Peytcheva et al. (2012) had student-
participants interact strategically as auditors and managers in a laboratory experiment and 
found that auditors who had been assigned a manager role in a previous round were more 
accurate in discerning true earnings from a manager’s reported earnings compared to 
auditors who had not experienced a manager role. The improvements in negotiation 
outcomes and financial reporting quality reported in these studies presumably occur as a 
result of obtaining a better understanding of the client’s perspective.8 
One of the most studied benefits of perspective taking is its ability to foster an 
increased understanding of the situation facing another individual (e.g., Regan and Totten 
1975; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). In fact, perspective taking is described in the 
psychology literature as “the active consideration of another’s point of view and the 
situation that person faces” (Galinsky 2002, p. 97). Although people often ignore the role 
of the situation in influencing the behavior of others, this appears to be a function of 
perspective. When asked to explain the actions of an individual from an observer’s (i.e., 
third-person) point of view, psychology studies report that people attribute the 
individual’s behavior to dispositional traits, with very little attention given to the 
                                                 
8
 Prior studies have used strategic reasoning, the consideration of management’s potential motives and 
actions, as a method to improve auditors’ fraud detection procedures (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; 
Bowlin 2011; Simon 2012). Strategic reasoning is derived from game theory and is used to anticipate the 
hypothetical actions of an opponent (Zimbelman and Waller 1999). Thus, strategic reasoning is useful 
during the planning phase of the audit to anticipate where and how management might hypothetically enact 
fraud. Once a misstatement is identified, however, anticipating a client’s action is no longer necessary. At 
this point, auditors require a reasoning process that can aid in the understanding of an already enacted 
behavior. The psychology literature suggests that evaluating another individual’s behavior from the 
“actor’s” point of view (i.e., perspective taking) leads to a greater understanding of the behavior and the 
circumstances within which the behavior was enacted (Ross and Nisbett 1991; Galinsky 2002; Eyal et al. 
2008; Batson 2009).   
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circumstances surrounding the behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971; Galper 1976; 
Gilbert 2002). By prompting participants to consider and explain another’s actions from 
the actor’s point of view (i.e., a first-person perspective), explanations become more 
focused on the situation and how existing circumstances might have influenced behavior 
(Regan and Totten 1975; Galper 1976; Eyal et al. 2008).  
The psychology literature suggests that when auditors use their natural, third-
person perspective to assess the risk that a misstatement was caused intentionally, they 
will be relatively insensitive to the circumstances surrounding the misstatement and their 
fraud implications (Jones and Nisbett 1971; Gilbert 2002). Conversely, considering the 
perspective of the manager responsible for the misstatement (i.e., the actor’s point of 
view) will increase auditors’ attention to fraud risk factors and the understanding of how 
these factors might have influenced the manager’s intentions to misstate (Regan and 
Totten 1975; Eyal et al. 2008; Epley and Caruso 2009). Thus, I expect that when the 
circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of higher fraud risk (i.e., the 
manager responsible for the misstatement has a direct incentive and opportunity to 
misstate), auditors who engage in perspective taking will assess misstatement 
intentionality higher than auditors who do not engage in perspective taking. Conversely, 
when the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of lower fraud risk, 
auditors who engage in perspective taking are expected to assess misstatement 
intentionality lower than auditors who do not engage in perspective taking. Stated 
formally, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: When the circumstances surrounding an identified misstatement are 
indicative of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective 
taking will assess the likelihood that the misstatement is intentional higher 
(lower) than auditors who do not engage in perspective taking.  
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The expected interaction is depicted in Panel A of Figure 2.1. Without the use of 
perspective taking, auditors are expected to fail to recognize the risk of fraud indicated by 
the circumstances surrounding an identified misstatement. Auditors who engage in 
perspective taking, however, will recognize the higher (lower) risk indicated by the 
circumstances surrounding the misstatement and will assess misstatement intentionality 
higher (lower) in accordance with the fraud risk factors that are present.
9
  
The psychology literature suggests that perspective taking results in (1) increased 
attention to the circumstances that might have influenced another’s behavior (e.g., Regan 
and Totten 1975) and (2) a greater understanding of how an individual might have 
perceived or interpreted these circumstances (Ross and Nisbett 1991). The following 
hypotheses are intended to provide support for the perspective taking mechanism in terms 
of how it is expected to influence auditors’ assessments of misstatement intentionality. 
 As previously discussed, perspective taking has been found to result in a greater 
sensitivity to the role of the situation in influencing the behavior of others (Regan and 
Totten 1975; Galper 1976; Eyal et al. 2008). Studies that have examined the effect of 
shifting perspectives have asked participants to explain an action either from their own 
observer’s perspective or instead by imagining themselves in the actor’s shoes (Regan 
and Totten 1975; Galper 1976). These studies find that explanations provided from an 
actor’s point of view focus to a greater extent on the surrounding circumstances and how 
these circumstances might have influenced the action being described. 
  
                                                 
9
 I note that it is possible that, due to a floor effect, there may be no difference between the misstatement 
intentionality assessments of auditors in the lower risk condition, regardless of engagement in perspective 
taking. This might be the case if auditors always maintain a certain level of skepticism when a 
misstatement is identified. Thus, the low risk line in Figure 2.1 might be flat rather than slanted downward.    
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Consistent with studies in psychology, I expect that auditors who evaluate a 
misstatement from the perspective of the manager who caused it will be more sensitive to 
circumstances that might have influenced the manager to intentionally misstate. 
Specifically, I expect these auditors to focus their attention on the fraud risk factors that 
provide the manager with a direct incentive and opportunity for fraud.
10
 Thus, when 
asked to describe the factors considered while evaluating misstatement intentionality, 
auditors who engage in perspective taking are expected to include a greater number of 
factors that provide the manager with a direct incentive and opportunity to intentionally 
misstate. Stated formally, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Auditors who engage in perspective taking will list a greater number 
of fraud risk factors that provide the manager with a direct incentive and 
opportunity to intentionally misstate compared to auditors who do not 
engage in perspective taking. 
 
Perspective taking provides insight into how another individual might perceive 
and interpret his or her surroundings (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971, Ross and Nisbett 
1991). It is the perceived desirability and feasibility of an action that causes an individual 
to form a behavioral intention (e.g., Ajzen 1985, 1991). Thus, when a manager perceives 
fraud to be both personally beneficial (i.e., an incentive) and relatively easy to perpetrate 
and conceal (i.e., an opportunity), the manager is more likely to form fraudulent 
intentions and engage in a fraudulent act.
11
  
                                                 
10
 Although considering all fraud risk factors is important, the present study is most interested in how 
auditors evaluate whether a specific client action was intentional. Psychology theory related to the 
formation of intentions, would suggest that the circumstances that are most salient to a manager at a given 
point in time will have the greatest influence on his behavioral intentions (Ajzen 1985, 1991; Eyal et al. 
2008). I expect that factors that provide a manager with a direct incentive to misstate and a direct 
opportunity to do so will be more salient, and thus more influential, than more distal factors.  
 
11
 The ability to rationalize a fraudulent act is the third element of the fraud triangle (PCAOB 2010a). 
Because my theory relates to the use of perspective taking to understand how the situation influences 
another’s behavior, I focus exclusively on incentives and opportunities, which are the elements most related 
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According to SAS No. 99, a manager is more likely to commit a fraudulent act 
when client circumstances impose a sufficient amount of pressure (AICPA 2002). To 
recognize when a set of circumstances impose a “sufficient amount of pressure,” and 
provide a sufficient opportunity for fraud, auditors should consider the manager’s 
interpretation of the situation (Ross and Nisbett 1991). Perspective taking provides 
insight into how another individual might perceive a set of circumstances. Thus, I 
propose that auditors who engage in perspective taking will recognize the extent to which 
the circumstances surrounding a misstatement provide the manager with an incentive and 
opportunity for fraud. Stated formally, my final hypotheses are as follows: 
H3a: When the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative 
of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking 
will assess the manager’s incentive for fraud higher (lower) than auditors 
who do not engage in perspective taking.  
 
H3b: When the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative 
of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking 
will assess the manager’s opportunity for fraud higher (lower) than 
auditors who do not engage in perspective taking.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
to client circumstances, whereas rationalization is how the individual justifies what he/she is going to do or 
has done.  
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PANEL A: Expected Interaction – H1 
  
 
 
 
PANEL B: Results – H1 
  
 
FIGURE 2.1 The figures above depict the expected (Panel A) and resulting (Panel B) 
interaction of fraud risk and perspective taking on auditors’ assessments of a 
misstatement’s intentionality.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS AND STUDY ADMINISTRATION 
Participants were provided through a grant from the Center for Audit Quality and 
included 82 auditors from the Big 4 public accounting firms, consisting of 25 managers, 
56 senior managers and one partner. Participants had a combined average of 9.6 years of 
audit experience. Through discussions with audit practitioners, it was determined that 
evaluating whether identified misstatements might be intentional is typically performed 
by auditors with this level of experience. Sixty-three participants accessed the experiment 
online using Qualtrics software and the remaining 19 participants completed the study in 
paper-based format. There were no differences in responses based on firm or medium of 
study administration.  
3.2 CASE MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES 
 I created case materials in consultation with an audit partner from a Big 4 firm. 
The case materials were then reviewed by three additional audit partners. Finally, the 
case was pilot tested with 21 audit managers and senior managers. I revised the case 
based on partner feedback and pilot test results in an attempt to increase the 
understandability of the case and adjust the strength of the manipulations.  
Participants were provided with case materials related to a hypothetical year-end 
audit engagement and were asked to evaluate a misstatement identified by the audit team. 
Participants were provided with an excerpt from the audit program that included 
 18 
 
instructions for evaluating identified misstatements. In addition to obtaining an 
understanding of the nature and cause of each misstatement and evaluating materiality, 
all participants were told to “consider whether each misstatement is or might be 
intentional,” consistent with the wording of AS No. 14 (PCAOB 2010a). The audit 
program instructions contained the manipulation of perspective taking, as will be 
described in the next section. Participants were asked to verify their understanding of the 
audit program instructions by initialing next to each step.  
After viewing the audit program instructions, participants received information 
related to the identified misstatement, including the circumstances contributing to its 
occurrence and the manager responsible. All participants received an explanation from 
client management that the misstatement had resulted from an unintentional classification 
error. Included within the case information were the manipulated fraud risk factors as 
well as information about the quantitative and qualitative materiality of the misstatement. 
The materiality information indicated that the misstatement was below all quantitative 
benchmarks and did not allow the company to meet a bonus target or analyst earnings 
target and did not mask a change in earnings or other trends. 
After participants finished reviewing the case information, they were asked to 
evaluate the likelihood that the misstatement is or might be intentional. Participants then 
described the facts that they considered when evaluating whether the misstatement was 
intentional, assessed the extent to which the manager responsible had an incentive and 
opportunity for fraud, indicated follow-up procedures, and answered demographic and 
manipulation check questions. 
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3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The study uses a 2x2 between subjects design in which perspective taking and 
fraud risk are manipulated. Additionally, the data is analyzed using a measure of 
perspective taking in place of the manipulated variable. Perspective taking has been 
analyzed in psychology studies by manipulating perspective taking via instructions (e.g., 
Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000), measuring individuals’ dispositional 
perspective taking ability via self-report (e.g., Davis 1983), or by measuring actual 
engagement in perspective taking using open-ended responses (e.g., McPherson Frantz 
and Janoff-Bulman 2000; Mallett et al. 2008). The present study employs two of these 
methods – a perspective taking manipulation, which could be easily integrated into audit 
work programs, and a perspective taking measure, which is intended to capture the extent 
to which auditors actively took the perspective of the client manager. Both manipulated 
variables (fraud risk and perspective taking) and the measured perspective taking variable 
are described in this section. 
3.3.1 FRAUD RISK MANIPULATION 
Fraud risk was manipulated by varying four pieces of information directly related 
to the manager responsible for the misstatement and the action leading to the 
misstatement. In this way, the fraud risk surrounding the misstatement’s occurrence was 
high or low, while general company information remained consistent between conditions. 
The four pieces of information that were manipulated included two fraud risk factors that 
varied the extent to which the manager responsible for the misstatement directly 
benefited from its occurrence (i.e., an incentive for the manager to intentionally misstate). 
The remaining two fraud risk factors varied the perceived ease or difficulty with which 
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the manager could have perpetrated and concealed the misstatement (i.e., an opportunity 
for the manager to intentionally misstate). See the Appendix for the full manipulations. I 
obtained verification from an audit partner that each of the high fraud risk factors did in 
fact increase the risk that the misstatement might be intentional. Additionally, the audit 
partner verified that the manipulations within the low risk condition successfully reduced 
the risk that the misstatement was intentional.   
3.3.2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING MANIPULATION 
Perspective taking is manipulated via the presence or absence of perspective 
taking instructions included within the audit program (PT Instructions-Present vs. PT 
Instructions-Absent). In all conditions, the audit program instructs participants to evaluate 
whether each misstatement is or might be intentional. Participants in the PT Instructions-
Present condition are told to evaluate the facts and circumstances related to the 
misstatement using the following evaluation process: “Think from the perspective of the 
client-individual responsible for the misstatement. Put yourself in the place of this client-
individual and try to imagine what you would think and how you would feel…”12 
Conversely, participants in the PT Instructions-Absent condition are told to evaluate the 
facts and circumstances “as you normally would in practice” (see the Appendix for the 
full manipulations).  
3.3.3 PERSPECTIVE TAKING MEASURE 
Studies in psychology suggest that perspective taking is an effortful process, 
which can be inhibited when there are high demands on one’s cognitive resources (e.g., 
                                                 
12
 The wording of the perspective taking manipulation is consistent with perspective taking studies in 
psychology, which instruct participants to imagine themselves in another’s shoes and consider their own 
thoughts and feelings under the circumstances facing another (e.g., Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000; Mallet et al. 2008) 
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Davis et al. 1996). Conversely, other studies have reported that some individuals 
naturally (i.e., spontaneously) engage in perspective taking even when not explicitly told 
to do so (e.g., Leith and Baumeister 1998; Mallett et al. 2008). Thus, it is possible that 
some auditors will fail to consider a manager’s perspective when instructed to do so 
and/or will naturally consider the manager’s perspective even when they do not receive 
perspective taking instructions. To deal with the potential difficulties of manipulating 
perspective taking, prior studies have captured the degree to which participants 
considered another’s perspective by coding their open-ended responses based on 
references to another’s perspective, interpretation, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, wants 
and/or desires (e.g., Leith and Baumeister 1998; McPherson, Frants and Janoff-Bulman 
2000; Mallett et al. 2008)  Coding of open-ended responses has been used within the 
audit literature to capture auditors’ mental states, including  problem representations and 
mental simulations (e.g., Hammersley 2006; Trotman et al. 2009). Because I am most 
interested in the effects of actively taking on the perspective of a client manager (i.e., 
simulating a manager’s perspective), I construct a measure of perspective taking 
engagement that is based on similar measures used within the psychology and audit 
literature. 
To construct the perspective taking engagement measure, I analyzed participants’ 
responses to a question asking them to explain the factors they considered while 
evaluating whether the misstatement might be intentional. Two coders (the author and a 
doctoral student with auditing experience) worked independently to code participant 
responses. Each participant was assigned a generic participant number, so that both 
coders were blind to the participant’s experimental condition during the coding process 
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and the doctoral student coder was blind to the hypotheses. A dichotomous coding 
scheme was used so that each response was either coded as (1) high in perspective taking 
engagement (High PT Engagement) or (2) low in perspective taking engagement (Low 
PT Engagement).
13
  
The measure of perspective taking engagement is based on whether participants 
documented that they had considered the perspective of the manager responsible for the 
misstatement while evaluating the misstatement’s intentionality. Consistent with the 
definition of perspective taking within the psychology literature and consistent with 
studies that have measured perspective taking using open-ended responses, participants 
were coded as High in PT Engagement if they made one or more references to the 
manager’s perspective, interpretation, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, wants, and/or desires. 
Responses that did not include reference to the manager’s perspective, thoughts, feelings, 
etc. were coded as Low in PT Engagement. See Figure 3.1 for examples of responses 
coded as High versus Low in PT Engagement. Forty-two of the 82 participants (51.2%) 
were coded as High in PT Engagement, while the remaining 40 (48.8%) participants were 
coded as Low in PT Engagement. Inter-rater agreement is 89.0 percent. Cohen’s Kappa, a 
measure of agreement over and above that expected by random agreement, is 0.78. 
Generally, Kappa values of .60 - .70 are considered to reflect a substantial level of 
agreement (Landis and Koch 1977; Fleiss 1981). All coding differences were mutually 
resolved. 
  
                                                 
13
 A dichotomous measure was chosen so that results could be easily shown in graphical format. 
Additionally, this allows the perspective taking measure to be easily compared to the manipulation of 
perspective taking, which has two levels (present versus absent). 
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3.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 Four dependent measures are used to test my hypotheses: misstatement 
intentionality assessments, attention to manager-specific fraud risk factors, and incentive 
and opportunity assessments. Participants’ assessments of misstatement intentionality 
(used to test H1) were elicited by asking participants the likelihood that the identified 
misstatement is or might be intentional on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – 
NOT at all Likely” and “10 – VERY Likely”.  
To measure auditors’ attention to manager-specific fraud risk factors (used to test 
H2), I asked participants to list facts from the case that they considered while evaluating 
whether the misstatement might be intentional. Because I expect perspective taking to 
focus auditors’ attention on circumstances that might have influenced a specific 
manager’s intentions to misstate, I used the number of manager-specific fraud risk factors 
listed by participants as the dependent variable. The manager-specific fraud risk factors 
include the four manipulated fraud risk factors (two related to the manager’s incentive to 
misstate and two related to his opportunity to misstate) and two additional fraud risk 
factors that were determined to be manager-specific, as they also related to the manager’s 
incentive or opportunity.
14
 In testing H2, any reference made to a manager-specific fraud 
risk factor is considered to provide evidence of attention, regardless of whether it is 
discussed as increasing or decreasing the risk of fraud. Participants were not able to refer 
back to the case while listing the factors they considered. The use of free recall to 
measure attention is consistent with prior auditing literature (e.g., Tan 1995; Phillips 
                                                 
14
 The two additional manager-specific fraud risk factors were (1) the fact that a supplier penalty had been 
incurred as a result of the manager’s failure to purchase a certain level of product (an incentive to hide the 
penalty) and (2) the fact that the manager had not submitted supporting documentation along with a 
payment request (an opportunity to hide the misclassified expense). These two facts were the same in all 
conditions. 
 24 
 
1999; Rose 2007). The same doctoral student coder and I worked independently to 
identify the number of manager-specific fraud risk factors listed by each participant. 
Inter-rater agreement is 86.6 percent and Cohen’s Kappa is .75, reflecting a substantial 
level of agreement (Landis and Koch 1977; Fleiss 1981). All differences in coding were 
mutually resolved. 
Finally, incentive and opportunity assessments (used to test H3a and H3b, 
respectively) measure the extent to which auditors believe the manager responsible for 
the misstatement had an incentive and opportunity to intentionally misstate. I ask 
participants to indicate the extent to which the manager had an incentive for fraud (i.e., 
how beneficial was it to the manager to intentionally misstate) on an 11-point scale 
ranging from “0 – No Incentive (Not at all Beneficial)” to “10 – Strong Incentive (Very 
Beneficial).” The extent to which the manager had an opportunity for fraud (i.e., how 
difficult/easy was it for the manager to misstate) is measured on an 11-point scale ranging 
from “0 – No Opportunity (Very Difficult)” to “10 – Strong Opportunity (Very Easy).”  
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Case Fact being  
Referred to in  
Participant Response 
Example of Participant Response Coded 
Low vs. High in PT Engagement 
Low in PT Engagement High in PT Engagement 
Control Deficiency “The approval for payment 
was made by someone who 
did not ordinarily perform 
the review since the primary 
reviewer was out of the 
office.” 
“Control was not working 
throughout the year due to 
personnel 
change...purchasing 
manager could have 
realized that adequate 
support didn’t need to be 
sent.” 
Responsibility for Initiation 
of Supply Agreement 
“Joe initiated the supply 
agreement and was 
responsible for setting the 
purchasing targets.” 
“Since Joe had the 
responsibility to initiate 
the contract and make 
purchases based on the 
contract, he might not 
want to be responsible for 
an additional expense.” 
Manager’s Performance 
Evaluation Criteria 
“Joe is evaluated…based on 
primary job responsibilities 
and operational 
performance and 
profitability of his 
division.” 
“From the employee’s 
perspective, his rating…is 
evaluated based on his 
performance of duties and 
an $800K + penalty 
would not look good for 
his performance.” 
 
FIGURE 3.1 The table above provides examples of participant responses that were coded 
as being High vs. Low in PT Engagement. Participant responses were elicited by asking 
them to list the factors they considered when evaluating whether the misstatement might 
be intentional. Italicized text within the High PT Engagement column points out the 
participant’s reference to the manager’s perspective, interpretation, thoughts, feelings, 
wants/desires that was considered by the coders to be an admission that the participant 
had considered the manager’s perspective while evaluating the misstatement. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
4.1 PERSPECTIVE TAKING MANIPULATION CHECK 
 Participants responded to a manipulation check question that asked them to 
indicate the instructions they had received regarding evaluating the misstatement. The 
two choices were as follows: “as I normally would in practice” or “from the perspective 
of Joe Rogers, Purchasing Manager (i.e., by imagining myself in the place of the client-
individual responsible for the misstatement).” Seventy-four of the 82 participants who 
completed the study (90.2%) correctly identified the instructions they had received. 
However, recalling the instructions received does not verify that participants actively 
considered the manager’s perspective during their evaluations. Thus, a more precise way 
of determining whether the perspective taking manipulation was successful is by using 
the measure of PT Engagement, which indicates whether participants actually considered, 
by their own admission, the manager’s perspective. I find that of the 42 participants who 
received perspective taking instructions, 19 actively engaged in perspective taking (i.e., 
were coded as High in PT Engagement) (45.2%).
15
 Of the participants who did not 
receive perspective taking instructions, 23 (57.5%) spontaneously considered the 
perspective of the manager without being prompted.  
                                                 
15
 Using a measure of perspective taking similar to the one used in the present study, Leith and Baumeister 
(1998) find that 72% of their participants actively engaged in perspective taking after receiving instructions 
to do so. The lower percentage found in my study may be due to the high cognitive demands of my task, 
which can make perspective taking particularly difficult (Davis et al. 1996).  
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Thus, I actually find that a higher percent of participants engaged in perspective 
taking when they did not receive instructions to do so, suggesting that my perspective 
taking manipulation did not have the intended effect. This finding is unexpected and may 
be due to differences in the individual perspective taking abilities of my participants 
(Davis 1983).  It appears that prompting auditors to engage in perspective taking is not 
sufficient to result in actual engagement in perspective taking, at least for the task 
employed in my study. This finding is inconsistent with psychology studies, which have 
successfully manipulated perspective taking using wording similar to the PT Instructions 
manipulation used in this study. Because my perspective taking manipulation was not 
successful, I rely on the PT Engagement measure to test my hypotheses. The PT 
Engagement measure is a more appropriate way of analyzing the effects of perspective 
taking in my study since it is critical that participants are using the appropriate mindset 
(i.e., considering the perspective of the client manager) if the benefits of perspective 
taking are expected to be obtained. I do provide results related to the effect of the PT 
Instructions manipulation on auditors’ misstatement intentionality judgments (although 
not significant) for descriptive purposes.  
4.2 RESULTS USING THE MANIPULATED PERSPECTIVE TAKING INSTRUCTIONS VARIABLE 
Consistent with an ineffective manipulation of perspective taking, I find that 
receiving PT Instructions does not influence auditors’ assessments of a misstatement’s 
intentionality in the manner predicted by H1. Panel A of Table 4.1 provides descriptive 
statistics for auditors’ misstatement intentionality assessments and Panel B provides 
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ANOVA results.
16
 The interaction between PT Instructions and Fraud Risk is not 
significant (F = 0.98, p = 0.327).
17
 The only significant effect in the model is the main 
effect for Fraud Risk (F = 13.98, p < 0.001). Tests of simple effects (untabulated) show 
that auditors’ misstatement intentionality assessments were significantly higher in the 
High Risk versus the Low Risk condition regardless of whether PT Instructions were 
Present (LS means 5.75 and 4.39, F = 3.51, p = 0.033, one-tailed) or Absent (LS means 
6.23 and 3.89, F = 12.11, p < 0.001, one-tailed). Because of the failed perspective taking 
manipulation, it is unclear from these results whether the misstatement intentionality 
assessments of auditors who actively engaged in perspective taking are driving the 
significant difference between the High Risk and Low Risk condition. Thus, to separate 
the effects of auditors who actively considered the manager’s perspective from those who 
did not, I test my hypotheses using the PT Engagement measure.
18
 
4.3 RESULTS USING THE MEASURED PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT VARIABLE 
 
4.3.1 CONTROL VARIABLES 
 To help rule out the alternative explanation that the PT Engagement measure is 
capturing participants’ level of effort or experience, I include three control variables in all 
of the analyses that use PT Engagement as an independent variable (i.e., in all tests of 
hypotheses and supplemental analyses). Two of the control variables, Total Facts and 
                                                 
16
 For analyzing the effect of the PT Instructions manipulation, the eight participants (9.8%) who failed the 
PT Instructions manipulation check question are excluded. Results are qualitatively unchanged when all 
participants are included in the analysis.  
17
 All reported p-values throughout the paper are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
18
 H2, H3a and H3b test the process through which perspective taking affects misstatement intentionality 
assessments. Because I do not find an effect of PT Instructions on assessments of misstatement 
intentionality, I do not report results for H2, H3a and H3b. Instead, these hypotheses are tested using the PT 
Engagement measure.  
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Time, proxy for participant effort in the experimental task, and Auditor Level proxies for 
general audit experience. Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for the control 
variables. Total Facts represents the number of case facts included by participants when 
asked to explain the factors they considered while evaluating the misstatement.
19
 Because 
the Total Facts measure is based on the same open-ended response used to measure PT 
Engagement, it controls for the amount of information included by participants. Time 
represents the number of minutes participants spent on the experimental task.
20
 Finally, 
Auditor Level represents the participant’s experience level (manager, senior manager or 
partner) within the audit firm.
21
 
4.3.2 TEST OF H1  
H1 predicts that when the factors surrounding a misstatement are indicative of 
higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking will assess the 
                                                 
19
 I chose to use the number of facts included by participants rather than the number of words because 
perspective taking has been found to foster information elaboration (Hoever et al. 2012). Thus, I would 
expect that when auditors engage in perspective taking, they will elaborate to a greater extent about the 
manager’s thoughts, feelings, interpretations, etc., resulting in a greater number of words. 
20
 Three participants were eliminated because they did not indicate their time on the paper-based instrument 
and seven additional participants were eliminated because their Time indicated that they had not completed 
the experiment in one sitting. Because some measures are memory-based, participants were instructed to 
complete the study in one sitting. Results are qualitatively unchanged when these participants are included 
in the analyses.   
21
 Results are qualitatively unchanged when additional control variables are included in the analyses. 
Because one firm did not provide full demographic data, the additional control variables utilize a reduced 
sample of 56 participants. The additional control variables include years of audit experience (in place of the 
auditor level control variable), number of frauds encountered in the last three years, and a measure of how 
often participants are responsible for evaluating the intentionality of misstatements on their audit teams 
(i.e., task experience), which was measured using an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Never” and 
“10 – Always.” Additionally, all analyses were run while controlling for the interaction of each control 
variable (Total Facts, Time and Auditor Level) with the Fraud Risk variable.  None of the interactions were 
significant in any of the models. Furthermore, all hypotheses are still supported when the interactions are 
included in the analyses. Thus, for simplicity, the final analyses do not include the control variable*fraud 
risk interactions.  
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likelihood that the misstatement is intentional higher (lower) than auditors who do not 
use perspective taking. Panel A of Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics and Panel B 
provides the results of an ANCOVA that includes PT Engagement and Fraud Risk as the 
independent variables as well as the three control variables. The ANCOVA table shows a 
significant interaction between PT Engagement and Fraud Risk on misstatement 
intentionality assessments (F = 4.72, p = 0.034), which provides initial support for H1. 
Because I expect a particular pattern of cell means, consistent with Panel A of 
Figure 2.1, I use a series of planned comparisons as my primary test of H1. Panel C 
reports the planned comparisons. I find that in the High Risk condition, misstatement 
intentionality assessments are significantly higher for auditors High in PT Engagement 
(LS mean 6.50) versus Low in PT Engagement (LS mean 3.82) (F = 12.59, p = 0.001). In 
the Low Risk condition, I do not find a significant difference between the assessments of 
auditors considered High versus Low in PT Engagement (4.29 and 4.03, respectively) (F 
= 0.13, p = 0.724). The null finding in the Low Risk condition might be due to a floor 
effect if the identification of a misstatement always results in auditors having a certain 
level of skepticism. Finally, I find that auditors High in PT Engagement assess 
misstatement intentionality significantly higher in the High versus Low Risk condition 
(LS means 6.50 and 4.29, respectively) (F = 9.03, p = 0.004). Conversely, auditors Low 
in PT Engagement do not assess misstatement intentionality differently when Fraud Risk 
is High (3.82) versus Low (4.03) (F = 0.07, p = 0.796). Thus, the auditors who engaged 
in perspective taking appear to be more sensitive to the differing levels of fraud risk 
indicated by the circumstances surrounding the misstatement. Panel B of Figure 2.1 
depicts the resulting divergent interaction, which supports H1. 
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Overall, these findings suggest that an auditor’s assessment of a misstatement’s 
intentionality is no different when the misstatement is surrounded by factors indicative of 
high versus low fraud risk, unless the auditor considers the perspective of the manager 
responsible for the misstatement. Furthermore, it appears that perspective taking is 
particularly helpful for recognizing when a misstatement is at a higher risk of being 
intentional, given that perspective taking had the greatest effect on misstatement 
intentionality assessments in the High Risk condition. 
4.3.3 TEST OF H2 
H2 predicts that auditors who engage in perspective taking will list a greater 
number of manager-specific fraud risk factors than auditors who do not engage in 
perspective taking.
22
 Panel A of Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics on the mean 
number of manager-specific fraud risk factors listed by participants. ANCOVA results in 
Panel B show a significant main effect for PT Engagement (F = 17.33, p < 0.001), which 
provides support for H2. Simple effects are presented in Panel C. I find that in the High 
Risk condition, auditors High in PT Engagement listed an average of 2.61 manager-
specific fraud risk factors, which is significantly higher than the 1.41 listed by auditors 
Low in PT Engagement (F = 17.77, p < 0.001). In the Low Risk condition, the number of 
                                                 
22
 The coding scheme for the PT Engagement measure was not based on whether participants identified 
manager-specific fraud risk factors, but rather whether participants actively considered the manager’s 
perspective. Participants who discussed manager-specific fraud risk factors (i.e., facts that influenced the 
incentive or opportunity for the manager to intentionally misstate) without mentioning what the manager 
might have thought or felt about those circumstances were coded as Low in PT Engagement (see Figure 3.1 
for examples). Thus, the PT Engagement coding scheme does not ensure support for H2. Furthermore, 32 
of the 35 participants coded Low in PT Engagement (91.4%) listed at least one manager-specific fraud risk 
factor, which indicates that risk factor identification does not ensure perspective taking. 
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manager-specific fraud risk factors listed by auditors High in PT Engagement (2.09) is 
not significantly higher than those Low in PT Engagement (1.67) (F = 2.13, p = 0.149).
23
  
These findings provide support for the theory that perspective taking increases the 
salience of the existing circumstances that might have influenced a manager’s intentions  
to misstate. The finding that auditors recalled roughly the same number of Total Facts 
regardless of condition (see Table 4.2) suggests that perspective taking resulted in 
increased attention to manager-specific fraud risk factors, not simply increased attention 
to case facts in general. Thus by engaging in perspective taking, auditors appear to be 
more sensitive to the fraud risk factors that indicate a manager who caused a 
misstatement had an incentive and opportunity to do so intentionally. 
4.3.4 TEST OF H3A AND H3B 
H3a and H3b predict that when the factors surrounding a misstatement are 
indicative of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking will 
recognize that the manager has a higher (lower) incentive and opportunity for fraud. 
Panel A of Table 4.5 provides separate sets of descriptive statistics for auditors’ incentive 
and opportunity assessments. Panel B displays the ANCOVA models for each dependent 
variable. I find that the interaction between PT Engagement and Fraud Risk is marginally 
significant for auditors’ incentive assessments (F = 3.56, p = 0.064), but is not significant 
                                                 
23
 Recall that the extent to which the manager-specific fraud risk factors increased or decreased fraud risk 
varied depending on whether participants were in the High Risk or Low Risk condition. Therefore, I 
analyzed whether participants discussed the manager-specific fraud risk factors as increasing fraud risk, 
decreasing fraud risk, or did not specify (i.e., remained neutral). I find that in the High Risk condition, 
auditors who were considered High (Low) in PT Engagement discussed 95.3% (56.5%) of the manager-
specific fraud risk factors listed as increasing fraud risk, 0% (17.4%) as decreasing fraud risk, and 4.7% 
(26.1%) as neutral. In the Low Risk condition, auditors who were considered High (Low) in PT 
Engagement discussed 39.4% (16.2%) of manager-specific fraud risk factors as increasing fraud risk, 
48.5% (29.7%) as decreasing fraud risk, and 12.1% (54.1%) as neutral 
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for opportunity assessments (F = 2.06, p = 0.156). Because I expect the same pattern of 
cell means as was predicted for H1 (see Panel A of Figure 2.1), I use a series of planned 
comparisons as the primary test of H3a and H3b. The results of the planned comparisons 
are reported in Panel C. 
The planned comparisons related to auditors’ incentive assessments suggest that 
the marginally significant interaction between PT Engagement and Fraud Risk is largely 
driven by the High Risk condition. In the High Risk condition, auditors High in PT 
Engagement assess the manager’s incentive for fraud to be significantly higher (LS mean 
7.57) than auditors Low in PT Engagement (LS mean 4.68) (F = 14.09, p < 0.001). I do 
not find a significant effect of PT Engagement on incentive assessments in the Low Risk 
condition (F = 0.95, p = 0.332). Finally, consistent with H3a, I find that auditors High in 
PT Engagement assess the manager’s incentive to be significantly higher in the High 
Risk (LS mean 7.57) versus the Low Risk condition (LS mean 4.20) (F = 20.40, p < 
0.001), while the difference between High and Low Risk is not significant for auditors 
Low in PT Engagement (F = 2.34, p = 0.131). Thus, when the circumstances surrounding 
a misstatement suggest that the responsible manager may have benefited from its 
occurrence, auditors who engage in perspective taking appear to recognize the manager’s 
increased incentive for fraud. 
Although I did not find a significant interaction between PT Engagement and 
Fraud Risk on auditors’ opportunity assessments, the planned comparisons do provide 
some support for H3b. Consistent with H3b, I find that in the Low Risk condition, 
auditors High in PT Engagement assess the manager’s opportunity for fraud to be 
significantly lower (LS mean 5.16) than auditors Low in PT Engagement (LS mean 6.31) 
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(F = 3.02, p = 0.044, one-tailed). I do not find a significant effect of PT Engagement in 
the High Risk condition (F = 0.13, p = 0.717). Finally, consistent with the divergent 
interaction that is predicted by H3b, I find that auditors High in PT Engagement assess 
the manager’s opportunity for fraud to be significantly higher in the High Risk (LS mean 
7.56) compared to the Low Risk condition (5.16) (F = 13.99, p < 0.001). Conversely, the 
difference between the High and Low Risk conditions is not significant for auditors Low 
in PT Engagement (F = 2.08, p = 0.154).   
Overall, the findings related to H3a and H3b suggest that by considering the 
manager’s perspective, auditors are more sensitive to the extent to which existing 
circumstances provide the manager with a direct incentive and opportunity for fraud. 
Auditors assessed the manager’s incentive and opportunity to be significantly greater in 
the presence of circumstances indicative of high versus low fraud risk, but only when 
they had considered the manager’s perspective. 
4.4 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: AUDITORS’ FOLLOW-UP JUDGMENTS AND PROCEDURES 
I performed a supplemental analysis to determine whether auditors who engage in 
perspective taking not only assess the risk that a misstatement is intentional more in line 
with the risk factors that are present, but also respond in appropriate ways. Table 4.6 
presents the results of this analysis, which used Tukey’s multiple comparisons procedure 
for each auditor judgment/procedure. According to the auditing standards, believing that 
a misstatement might be intentional should impact auditors’ assessments of fraud risk, 
materiality and management’s integrity (SEC 1999; AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010a).24 I 
                                                 
24
 Fraud Risk (Materiality) Assessments were collected on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – 
Very Low (Immaterial)” and “10 – Very High (Material).” Integrity Assessment measures participants’ 
assessment of the integrity/ethicality of the manager who caused the misstatement and was collected on an 
11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Not At All Ethical” and “10 – Very Ethical.” 
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find that auditors High in PT Engagement assessed the overall level of fraud risk 
significantly higher in the High Risk condition (LS mean 6.26) compared to the Low 
Risk condition (LS mean 4.44) (p = 0.012). They also assessed the materiality level of the 
misstatement significantly higher in the High Risk (4.09) versus Low Risk condition 
(1.54) (p = 0.005). Conversely, the fraud risk and materiality assessments of auditors 
Low in PT Engagement are not significantly different between Fraud Risk conditions (p 
= 0.075 for fraud risk and p = 0.302 for materiality). I find no differences between any of 
my experimental conditions for auditors’ assessment of the manager’s integrity (all p-
values > 0.100).  
Finally, I asked participants to indicate the likelihood of performing various 
procedures to further investigate for fraud, suggested by auditing standards and prior 
literature (SEC 1999; Asare and Wright 2004; PCAOB 2010a; Hammersley et al. 2011). I 
find that for each of these procedures, auditors High in PT Engagement were significantly 
more likely to enact the procedure in the High Risk versus the Low Risk condition. These 
follow-up procedures include investigating further for fraud (LS means 6.77 and 5.20, p = 
0.003), increasing testing procedures (6.47 and 5.08, p = 0.040), communicating concerns 
to client management (5.38 and 3.16, p = 0.002), communicating concerns to the audit 
committee (4.61 and 2.49, p = 0.001), and consulting with a forensic specialist (4.65 and 
2.78, p = 0.004). For auditors Low in PT Engagement, I find no significant differences in 
the likelihood of performing these procedures between the High and Low Risk conditions 
(all p-values > 0.200). These results suggest that auditors who engage in perspective 
taking are more likely to investigate an identified misstatement further for evidence of 
fraud when the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of high versus low fraud risk.  
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TABLE 4.1: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING INSTRUCTIONS AND FRAUD 
RISK ON MISSTATEMENT INTENTIONALITY ASSESSMENTS 
 
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Misstatement Intentionality 
Assessments
a
 
 
 PT Instructions – Present  PT Instructions - Absent 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 18)__   
High Risk 
__( n = 16)__ 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 18)__ 
High Risk 
__( n = 22)__ 
 4.39 
 
(2.17) 
 
5.75 
(2.57) 
 3.89 
(2.00) 
6.23 
(1.77) 
      
 
PANEL B: ANOVA Table – Misstatement Intentionality Assessments 
 
_______Source_______ _df_ _SS_ _F_ p-value
 
 
PT Instructions 1 0.002 0.00 0.982 
Fraud Risk 1 62.48 13.98 <0.001 
PT Instructions*Fraud Risk 1 4.36 0.98 0.327 
Error 70 312.92   
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Note: All p-values are two-tailed. 
a
 Assessments of Misstatement Intentionality were measured by asking participants to 
indicate the likelihood that an identified misstatement is or might be intentional using an 
11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at all Likely” and “10 – Very Likely.” 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – MEAN MEDIAN (STANDARD 
DEVIATION) OF EFFORT AND EXPERIENCE CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
 PT Engagement - High  PT Engagement - Low 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 14)__   
High Risk 
__( n = 23)__ 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 21)__ 
High Risk 
_( n = 14)__ 
Total Facts
a
 3.57 
3.50 
(1.91) 
 
3.57 
3.00 
(1.31) 
 3.48 
4.00 
(1.54) 
3.36 
3.00 
(1.60) 
Time
b
 
 
24.60 
19.50 
(18.94) 
 
18.77 
15.78 
(8.47) 
 16.68 
15.58 
(10.06) 
27.39 
22.25 
(16.09) 
Auditor Level
c
 2.71 
(0.47) 
2.78 
(0.52) 
 2.52 
(0.51) 
2.86 
(0.36) 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Note: Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics related to the three control variables that 
are included in all statistical tests using the PT Engagement measure. These covariates 
are used to control for auditor effort in the experimental task and auditor experience.  
a 
Total Facts (a proxy for effort) is the total number of case facts included by participants 
when asked to explain the information used to assess misstatement intentionality.  
b 
Time (a proxy for effort) is the average number of minutes spent on the study. 
c 
Auditor Level is an indicator variable where 1 represents a senior-level auditor, 2 
represents a manager-level auditor, 3 represents a senior manager-level auditor, and 4 
represents a partner-level auditor. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4.3: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT AND FRAUD 
RISK ON MISSTATEMENT INTENTIONALITY ASSESSMENTS 
 
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Misstatement Intentionality 
Assessments
a
 
 
 PT Engagement – High  PT Engagement - Low 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 14)__   
High Risk 
__( n = 23)__ 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 21)__ 
High Risk 
__( n = 14)__ 
 4.29 
 
(2.17) 
 
6.50 
(1.61) 
 4.03 
(2.43) 
3.82 
(2.24) 
 
 
PANEL B: ANCOVA Table – Misstatement Intentionality Assessments 
 
_______Source_______ _df_ _SS_ _F_ p-value
 
 
PT Engagement 1 36.59 8.18 0.006 
Fraud Risk 1 16.00 3.58 0.063 
PT Engagement*Fraud Risk 1 21.12 4.72 0.034 
Total Facts 1 9.34 2.09 0.153 
Time 1 8.63 1.93 0.170 
Auditor Level 2 2.30 0.26 0.774 
Error 64 286.32   
 
 
 
PANEL C: Planned Comparisons 
 
______________Comparison______________ F p-value
 
 
High Risk: High PT Engagement > Low PT Engagement  12.59 0.001
 
 
Low Risk: High PT Engagement < Low PT Engagement 0.13 0.724
 
 
High PT Engagement: High Risk > Low Risk 9.03 0.004
 
 
Low PT Engagement: High Risk = Low Risk 0.07 0.796 
 
_______________________________________ 
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from 
Table 4.2. 
a
 Assessments of Misstatement Intentionality were measured by asking participants to 
indicate the likelihood that an identified misstatement is or might be intentional using an 
11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at all Likely” and “10 – Very Likely.” 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4.4: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT ON ATTENTION 
TO MANAGER-SPECIFIC FRAUD RISK FACTORS 
 
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Auditor Attention to Manager-
Specific Fraud Risk Factors
a
 
 
PT Engagement - High  PT Engagement - Low 
Low Risk 
_( n = 14)_   
High Risk 
_( n = 23)_ 
Total  
_(n = 37)_ 
 Low Risk 
_( n = 21)_ 
High Risk 
_( n = 14)_ 
Total 
_(n = 35)_ 
2.09 
 
(1.08) 
 
2.61 
(1.13) 
2.35 
(1.11) 
 1.67 
(0.94) 
1.41 
(1.15) 
1.54 
(1.02) 
 
 
PANEL B: ANCOVA Table – Attention to Manager-Specific Fraud Risk Factors 
 
_______Source_______ _df_ _SS_ _F_ p-value
 
 
PT Engagement 1 11.10 17.33 <0.001 
Fraud Risk 1 0.024 0.39 0.537 
PT Engagement*Fraud Risk 1 2.23 3.50 0.066 
Total Facts 1 26.40 41.23 <0.001 
Time 1 1.43 2.24 0.140 
Auditor Level 2 0.87 0.68 0.510 
Error 64 40.98   
 
 
 
PANEL C: Planned Comparisons 
 
______________Comparison______________ F p-value
 
 
High Risk: High PT Engagement > Low PT Engagement  17.77 <0.001
 
 
Low Risk: High PT Engagement > Low PT Engagement 2.13 0.149 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from 
Table 4.2. 
a
 Attention to Manager-Specific Fraud Risk Factors was measured as the number of fraud 
risk factors listed by participants related to the incentives and opportunities of the 
manager responsible for the misstatement. The maximum number of items that 
participants could have listed for this measure was six. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4.5: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT AND FRAUD 
RISK ON INCENTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENTS 
 
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Incentive and Opportunity 
Assessments
a
  
 
 PT Engagement - High  PT Engagement - Low 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 15)__   
High Risk 
__( n = 27)__ 
 Low Risk 
__( n = 25)__ 
High Risk 
__( n = 15)__ 
Incentive 4.20 
(2.40) 
7.57 
(1.57) 
 3.44 
(2.26) 
4.68 
(2.72) 
Opportunity 5.16 
(1.86) 
7.56 
(2.15) 
 6.31 
(1.60) 
7.32 
(1.66) 
 
 
 
PANEL B: ANCOVA Tables – Incentive Assessment and Opportunity Assessment  
 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable___ 
 
___Source___________ 
 
_df_ 
 
_SS_ 
 
_F_ 
 
p-value
 
 
Incentive PT Engagement 1 56.06 12.04 0.001 
 Fraud Risk 1 85.77 18.41 <0.001 
 PT Engagement*Fraud Risk 1 16.58 3.56 0.064 
 Total Facts 1 22.93 4.92 0.030 
 Time 1 15.25 3.27 0.075 
 Auditor Level 2 1.37 0.15 0.864 
 Error 64 298.12 
 
  
 
Opportunity PT Engagement 1 3.50 1.03 0.315 
 Fraud Risk 1 46.35 13.58 0.001 
 PT Engagement*Fraud Risk 1 7.04 2.06 0.156 
 Total Facts 1 4.86 1.42 0.237 
 Time 1 2.56 0.75 0.390 
 Auditor Level 2 10.75 1.58 0.215 
 Error 64 218.36   
 
_______________________________________ 
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from 
Table 4.2. 
a
 Assessments of the manager’s incentive (opportunity) were measured on an 11-point 
scale with endpoints labeled 0 – No Incentive (Opportunity) and 10 – Strong Incentive 
(Opportunity). 
________________________________________________________________________  
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TABLE 4.5 (CONTINUED) 
 
PANEL C: Planned Comparisons 
 
Dependent 
Variable____ 
 
____________Comparison_______________ 
 
_F_ 
 
p-value 
Incentive  High Risk: PT Engagement High > Low 14.09 <0.001 
 Low Risk: PT Engagement High < Low 0.95 0.332 
 High PT Engagement: High Risk > Low Risk 20.40 <0.001 
 Low PT Engagement: High Risk = Low Risk 2.34 0.131 
Opportunity High Risk: PT Engagement High > Low 0.13 0.717 
 Low Risk: PT Engagement High < Low 3.02 0.087 
 High PT Engagement: High Risk > Low Risk 13.99 <0.001 
 Low PT Engagement: High Risk = Low Risk 2.08 0.154 
 
_______________________________________ 
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from 
Table 4.2. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4.6: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: LEAST SQUARES MEAN (STANDARD 
DEVIATION) OF SUBSEQUENT AUDIT JUDGMENTS AND PROCEDURES  
 
 PT Engagement - High  PT Engagement - Low 
_Assessment/Procedure_ 
Low Risk 
_( n = 14)_   
High Risk 
_( n = 23)_ 
 Low Risk 
_( n = 21)_ 
High Risk 
_( n = 14)_ 
Fraud Risk Assessment 
 
4.44
 a
 
(1.69) 
 
6.26
 a
 
(1.53) 
 4.05 
(1.33) 
5.58 
(2.15) 
Materiality Assessment 1.54
 a
 
(1.53) 
 
4.09
 a b
 
(2.47) 
 2.96
 
 
(2.05) 
1.55
 b
 
(2.10) 
Integrity Assessment 4.93 
(1.44) 
 
4.33 
(1.65) 
 5.35 
(1.47) 
5.33 
(0.94) 
Investigate Further for 
Presence of Fraud  
5.20
 a
 
(1.67) 
 
6.77
 a
 
(0.42) 
 5.46
 
 
(1.75) 
6.30
 
 
(0.65) 
Increase Testing of  
Cash Disbursements 
5.08
 a
 
(2.15) 
 
6.47
 a
 
(0.95) 
 5.80 
(1.69) 
6.32 
(1.01) 
Communicate Concerns 
to Client Management 
3.16
 a
 
(1.50) 
 
5.38
 a
 
(1.50) 
 3.50 
(1.74) 
4.44 
(1.82) 
Communicate Concerns 
to Audit Committee 
2.49
 a
 
(1.53) 
 
4.61
 a
 
(1.50) 
 2.69 
(1.67) 
3.46 
(1.31) 
Consult with Forensic 
Specialist  
2.78
 a
 
(1.07) 
 
4.65
 a
 
(1.96) 
 3.80 
(1.69) 
3.43 
(1.03) 
________________________________________ 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics regarding subsequent audit judgments and 
planned procedures indicated by participants after having assessed misstatement 
intentionality. Fraud Risk (Materiality) Assessments were collected on an 11-point scale 
with endpoints labeled “0 – Very Low (Immaterial)” and “10 – Very High (Material).” 
Integrity Assessment measures participants’ assessment of the integrity/ethicality of the 
manager who caused the misstatement and was collected on an 11-point scale with 
endpoints labeled “0 – Not At All Ethical” and “10 – Very Ethical.” The remaining 
subsequent audit procedures were collected on 7-point likelihood scales with endpoints 
labeled “Very Unlikely” and “Very Likely.”   
a,b
 For each audit assessment/procedure, superscripts of the same letter indicate that the 
means are different at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). All other comparisons are not significant at p 
< 0.05. All analyses include the control variables from Table 4.2. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Fraud detection continues to be an important consideration for auditors. A failure 
to detect fraud has serious consequences for both the audit firm and the larger public 
(Palmrose 1987; Bonner et al. 1998; Beasley et al. 2010). As such, it is important that 
auditors continue to improve their fraud detection skills. In the present study, I examined 
whether considering the perspective of the manager responsible for a misstatement’s 
occurrence influences auditors’ sensitivity to the level of fraud risk surrounding the 
misstatement and the resulting belief that the misstatement was intentional.   
The results of the present study suggest that by engaging in perspective taking, 
auditors are more likely to recognize when the circumstances surrounding an identified 
misstatement suggest that it was caused intentionally. Consistent with psychology theory 
related to perspective taking, I find that auditors who considered the manager’s 
perspective, compared to those who did not, gave more attention to the circumstances 
that might have influenced the manager’s actions (i.e., manager-specific fraud risk 
factors). Furthermore, auditors who engaged in perspective taking recognized the 
manager’s increased incentive to misstate in the high fraud risk condition, relative to the 
low fraud risk condition. Most importantly, I find that when the circumstances 
surrounding a misstatement were indicative of high fraud risk, auditors who engaged in 
perspective taking assessed misstatement intentionality higher than those who did not use 
perspective taking. Conversely, the assessments of auditors who did not engage in 
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perspective taking were no different when factors surrounding a misstatement were 
indicative of high or low fraud risk. The implications of failing to recognize the level of 
fraud risk surrounding an identified misstatement are that auditors may not investigate a 
misstatement further when doing so might be warranted by the circumstances.  
There are some limitations to the present study. First, the use of perspective 
taking relies on the evaluation of fraud risk factors that are observable to the auditor. To 
the extent that a manager’s fraudulent intentions are influenced by factors that are 
unobservable to the auditor (e.g., personal financial troubles), the utility of perspective 
taking might be reduced. Second, the study uses a specific misstatement scenario as well 
as a specific type of misstatement (a known misstatement/understatement of expenses); 
therefore, some caution must be used when generalizing the results. Finally, it appears 
that simply instructing auditors to think from the manager’s perspective is not sufficient. I 
find that receiving perspective taking instructions had no effect on auditors’ misstatement 
intentionality assessments. Furthermore, participants who received perspective taking 
instructions were no more likely to actively engage in perspective taking than those who 
did not receive such instructions. 
Although the present study cannot determine what caused some auditors to 
engage in perspective taking or what prevented others from doing so, there are some 
potential explanations. First, in the absence of perspective taking instructions, auditors 
were told to evaluate the misstatement’s intentionality “as they normally would in 
practice.” It would appear that for some auditors, their normal evaluation process already 
involves considering the perspective of the responsible manager, since some auditors 
engaged in perspective taking naturally. Perspective taking is considered to be a social 
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skill that is improved over time through direct perspective taking experience (Iannotti 
1978; Chalmers and Townsend 1990). Thus, the more auditors have considered the 
perspective of management in practice, the easier and more successful the perspective 
taking process theoretically should be. Based on this reasoning, audit firms may want to 
consider including tasks within firm trainings that involve the consideration of a client 
manager’s perspective to provide auditors with increased perspective taking experience. 
Second, prior studies in psychology suggest that people have varying levels of 
dispositional perspective taking abilities (e.g., Davis 1983). Therefore, it is possible that 
the auditors who were prompted to use perspective taking, but did not, may not have been 
able to discard their own perspective to take on the perspective of the manager. 
Conversely, the auditors who spontaneously considered the manager’s perspective may 
possess a greater dispositional perspective taking ability. Future research can explore 
whether individual differences in perspective taking abilities influence how well auditors 
perform in fraud detection tasks and whether training may help those who tend not to 
consider the perspectives of others naturally. Determining what causes some auditors to 
engage in perspective taking and/or what prevents others from doing so is largely a 
question for future research to explore.  Approximately half of the auditors in the present 
study considered the manager’s perspective, suggesting that there is room for 
improvement. 
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APPENDIX A: EXCERPTS FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
 
The following pages provide excerpts from my experimental instrument, including an 
overview of the identified misstatement, followed by the manipulation of perspective 
taking instructions and fraud risk. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED MISSTATEMENT 
Joe Rogers is the primary individual responsible for purchasing decisions at Green 
Division (a division of C&P). The identified misstatement was the result of inaccurate 
information provided by Joe Rogers in a Payment Request form. In the form, he 
classified a payment being made to a supplier as a prepayment for future purchases. The 
payment actually related to a one-time penalty triggered by Green Division’s failure to 
purchase the minimum amount of product specified within a Supply Agreement. As a 
result of the inaccurate payment classification, the accounting department recorded the 
payment as a prepaid asset rather than an expense. The misclassification was not 
identified during the review process, in part because Joe Rogers did not include 
documentation to support the purpose of the payment. C&P management believes that, 
“The payment was incorrectly classified as a prepayment by Joe Rogers because 
prepayments are a frequent occurrence with many of our suppliers. However, we rarely 
incur a penalty for missing a minimum purchasing target. As such, in filling out the 
Payment Request form, Joe Rogers accidentally selected a prepayment classification 
rather than selecting the appropriate expense classification, and unfortunately this 
mistake was not caught during the review process.” 
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MANIPULATION OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING INSTRUCTIONS (ABSENT VS. PRESENT) 
Note: All participants received an excerpt from the audit program. The perspective taking 
manipulation appeared within the third step of the audit program, directly following the 
instructions to “consider whether each misstatement is or might be intentional.”  
 
Audit Program: 
Evaluating Identified Misstatements 
I have read and 
understand the 
instructions 
1.) Obtain an understanding of the nature and cause of each misstatement.  
2.) Evaluate whether each misstatement is material.  
Take into account both quantitative and qualitative materiality factors. 
 
3.) Consider whether each misstatement is or might be intentional.   
In considering whether a misstatement might be intentional, evaluate 
the facts and circumstances related to the misstatement 
 
 
Perspective Taking Absent: 
…as you normally would in practice. 
 
Perspective Taking Present: 
…by using the following evaluation process required by your firm: 
Think from the perspective of the client-individual responsible for the 
misstatement. Put yourself in the place of this client-individual and try to imagine 
what you would think and how you would feel about the act of misstating under 
the circumstances faced by the client. 
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FRAUD RISK MANIPULATION (HIGH RISK VS. LOW RISK) 
Note: The High and Low Risk manipulations were seeded within additional information 
provided to participants. The first two manipulations vary the extent to which Joe Rogers 
had an incentive to misstate and the final two vary the extent to which he had an 
opportunity to misstate. 
High Risk Low Risk 
Contract Initiation: 
Joe Rogers initiated the Supply 
Agreement and was responsible for 
setting the purchasing targets. 
Contract Initiation: 
Joe Rogers did not initiate the Supply 
Agreement and was not responsible for 
setting the purchasing targets. 
Joe Rogers’ Performance Evaluation 
Criteria: Manager performance is 
evaluated at the end of each year to 
determine raises and promotions based on 
(1) the manager’s primary job 
responsibilities and (2) the operational 
performance and overall profitability of 
the manager’s division. 
Joe Rogers’ Performance Evaluation 
Criteria: Manager performance is 
evaluated at the end of each year to 
determine raises and promotions based on 
(1) the manager’s primary job 
responsibilities and (2) compliance with 
Company policies and proper financial 
reporting practices. 
Current Year Control Testing:  
Testing results revealed that the Corporate 
Treasurer normally approves Payment 
Requests. However, due to a seven month 
leave of absence, the Corporate 
Treasurer’s responsibilities were 
temporarily assumed by another 
individual who was not familiar with the 
approval process. During this seven 
month period, multiple Payment 
Requests were submitted without proper 
supporting documentation, including the 
one associated with the misstatement. 
Thus, multiple Payment Requests were 
identified that were improperly approved. 
These multiple exceptions indicate that 
the approval process was consistently 
ineffective throughout most of the year in 
rejecting unsupported Payment Requests. 
Current Year Control Testing:  
Testing results revealed that the Corporate 
Treasurer normally approves Payment 
Requests. However, due to a one week 
leave of absence, the Corporate 
Treasurer’s responsibilities were 
temporarily assumed by another 
individual who was not familiar with the 
approval process. During this one week 
period, the only Payment Request that 
was submitted without proper supporting 
documentation was the one associated 
with the misstatement. Thus, this is the 
only Payment Request identified that 
was improperly approved. This isolated 
exception indicates that the approval 
process was consistently effective 
throughout most of the year in rejecting 
unsupported Payment Requests. 
Internal Audit Involvement:  
C&P internal audit does not perform 
testing at Green Division. Out of the six 
divisions of C&P, internal audit 
consistently performs testing at the two 
largest divisions each year - Houston 
Division and Portland Division. 
Internal Audit Involvement:  
C&P internal audit periodically perform 
testing at Green Division. Out of the six 
divisions of C&P, internal audit 
consistently performs unannounced 
testing at two randomly selected 
divisions each year. 
 
